Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs COMELEC (2006) (Political Law)

Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 162759 | August 4, 2006

Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voters” however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution.

When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that “all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,” observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic?

Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which however, remains unresolved.

The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. 

The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]

Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution? 

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.  The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.  Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.  

Synopsis of Cases on Choice-of-Law in Property

Llantino vs. Co Liong Chong (1990): Capacity of the person to transfer or acquire real property is governed by law of the place where property is located: Constitution allows an alien to use lands for residential purposes for a reasonable period (i.e. through lease); so is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

Asiatic Petroleum vs. Co Quico (1940): Mobilia sequuntur personam was used to consider general convenience and public policy; it cannot be applied if it would result in inescapable and patent injustice. Modern view is to make no distinction on rules on movables and immovables. All property within a State is subject to the jurisdiction of its courts, and they have the right to adjudicate title thereto, to enforce liens thereupon, and to subject it to the payment of the debts of its owners whether resident or not.

CIR vs. Anglo California National Bank (1960): (1) Shares of stocks are considered as intangible personal properties.  (2) Tax Code levies income taxes on foreign corporations only on income derived from sources within the Philippines and with respect to capital gains on the sale of personal properties. (3) Tax Code deems place of sale as place or source of capital gain.

Emerald Garment Mfg. Corp. vs. CA (1995): (1) Any foreign corporation which is a national/domiciliary of a country which is a party to a convention, treaty or agreement relating to intellectual property to which the Philippines is also a party or extends reciprocal rights to our nationals by law shall be entitled to benefits to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention. (2) A foreign corporation may have the capacity to sue for infringement but the question of whether they have an exclusive right over their trademark will depend on the actual use of the emblem in the local market. (3) For lack of adequate proof of actual proof of actual use of its trademark in the Philippines prior to local corporation’s use of its own mark and for failure to establish confusing similarity between said trademarks, foreign corporation’s action for infringement must necessarily fail.

Synopsis of Cases on Choice-of-Law in Family Relations

Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (1922): (1) Marriages contracted outside the Philippines if valid in country where contracted is considered as valid in the Philippines. (2) Philippine marriage followed by many (Eg. 23, 40) years of uninterrupted marital life should not be impugned and discredited, after death of one spouse and administration of his estate, through an alleged prior marriage in a foreign country, save upon clear, strong and unequivocal proof as to produce a moral conviction of existence of such impediment. 

People vs. Mora Dumpo (1935): (1) Necessary requisites for validity of Muslim marriage must be proved as fact. (2) Consent of bride’s father/chief of tribe is indispensable requisite for validity of Muslim marriage. (3) Essential element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. No bigamy where second marriage lacks an essential requisite. 

Wong Woo Yu vs. Vivo (1965): (1) Marriage contracted outside Philippines which is valid under law of country where it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. (2) But said foreign country’s law on marriage must be proved as fact. (3) In the absence of such proof, it should be presumed that said foreign law is same as our own (Processual Presumption).

Tenchavez vs. Escano (1965): (1) Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized as valid in this jurisdiction; neither is the marriage contracted with another by the divorced consort made after said divorce decree. (2) Remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation. (3) Desertion and securing of invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.

Therkelsen vs. Republic (1964): Alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law. Civil Code only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (1) non-residents or (2) residents but Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government.

Ng Hian vs. Collector of Customs (1916): (in citing US case Ex parte Fong Yim) Whether adoption is genuine is a question of fact, open to investigation. Adoption in China is substantially without legal formalities. No difference between legal status of adopted children and of legal children. An adopted child of a Filipina stepmother has a right to enter the Philippines.